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Abstract
The problem of skepticism is often understood as a paradox: a valid argument with 
plausible premises whose conclusion is that we lack justification for perceptual 
beliefs. Typically, this conclusion is deemed unacceptable, so a theory is offered 
that posits conditions for justification on which some premise is false. The theory 
defended here is more general, and explains why the paradox arises in the first place. 
Like Strawson’s (Introduction to logical theory, Wiley, New York, 1952) “ordinary 
language” approach to induction, the theory posits something built into the very 
notion of justification: it is loaded with a bias towards the proposition that we are 
not massively deceived. Beyond the paradox, remaining skeptical problems consist 
of metaphysical and practical questions: whether we are massively deceived, or why 
we should use our loaded notion rather than some other. Such challenges have pro-
found epistemological significance, but they are not problems that an a priori theory 
of justification can solve.
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The problem of skepticism is often understood as a paradox: a valid argument with 
seemingly plausible premises whose conclusion is that we lack justification for per-
ceptual beliefs. Typically, this conclusion is deemed unacceptable, so a theory is 
offered that specifies conditions for justification on which some premise in the skep-
tical argument is false. Solving the paradox in this way is a major, if not the main, 
role that theories of justification serve in contemporary epistemology. A different 
sort of theory of justification is presented here. It posits something more general 
about the notion of justification, which explains why theories of justification reject 
the skeptical conclusion, and why the paradox arises in the first place. Like Dogra-
maci (2012) and Schafer’s (2014) recent contributions, the theory aims to shed light 
on the concept of justification by considering its function. Like Strawson’s (1952) 
“ordinary language” approach to the problem of induction, the theory posits that 
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there is something built into the very notion we use to evaluate our beliefs. The basic 
idea is that the notion of justification is loaded with a bias towards the proposition 
that we are not massively deceived.
After applying Strawson’s “analytic” approach to perceptual justification and 
using it to explain the paradox, I will consider the main objections to Strawson that 
may be thought to apply to the view defended here. A new picture emerges of the 
role of theories of justification in answering skeptical challenges. If our notion of 
justification is loaded, the paradox amounts to the challenge: Is there something we 
could plausibly mean by ‘justified’ that is properly epistemic and avoids commit-
ment to the premises of the paradox? The remaining, other skeptical problems con-
sist of other, metaphysical and practical challenges. Such challenges have profound 
epistemological significance, but they are not problems about the conditions for jus-
tification, as most epistemologists have taken skepticism to be. If one is interested 
in a metaphysical or practical skeptical question, such as whether we are massively 
deceived, or why we should use our loaded notion rather than some other, then the 
loadedness of justification does nothing to help. But neither does any theory of justi-
fication, I will argue.1
1  The paradox and theories of justification
In this section I briefly outline the paradox and the way in which theories of justifi-
cation are typically used to solve it.
Let ‘p’ stand for some contingent, external-world proposition that we typically 
believe on the basis of perception, such as that there are hands; let ‘sk’ stand for 
some skeptical hypothesis according to which you are massively deceived about 
things such as p. A typical skeptical argument has this form:
(1) You don’t have justification to believe ~sk.
(2) If you have justification to believe p, then you have justification to believe ~sk.
So,
(3) You don’t have justification to believe p.
Though this is the most common formulation in recent discussions, there are 
variations. For example, while most discussions appeal to a “closure” principle to 
motivate (2), some instead appeal to an “underdetermination” principle, according 
to which having justification to believe p implies that one’s evidence favors p over 
all of p’s alternatives, including sk. Much of my discussion concerning (1)–(3) can 
1 The term ‘notion’ is intended to be synonymous with ‘concept’ while carrying a salient implication—
especially in the context of a discussion of skepticism—that the thing of which we have a notion may not 
actually exist. See Merriam Webster’s Dictionary of Synonyms for an explanation of the subtle differ-
ences between ‘notion’, ‘concept’, and some other related terms.
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be applied to such alternative formulations of the paradox. However, the relation 
between closure and underdetermination is disputed, and adjudicating this would 
take us too far afield. So, let us just assume that some kind of closure principle moti-
vates (2).2
The conclusion, (3), is usually taken to be unacceptable, so (1)–(3) constitutes a 
paradox, and solving it requires explaining how one of the premises is false. (2) is 
widely—though not universally—accepted, especially for versions of sk on which 
p logically entails ~sk. And, though most are comfortable asserting that (1) is false, 
it has proven difficult to show how it could be false, or what our justification for 
believing ~sk could be. Another element of the debate about justification is that a 
theory must account for why the paradox arose in the first place.3 As we will see, 
the loadedness of justification4 provides a good explanation for why justification to 
believe ~sk is so hard to specify, and why the paradox arises. For now, recall the 
usual difficulties with refuting (1). There seems to be no obvious a priori evidence 
or argument for the deeply contingent proposition that ~sk, and any appeal to non-a 
priori, or empirical evidence seems, prima facie, inappropriately question-begging 
or circular. For, things would seem empirically just as they do now if sk were true, 
and how could appealing to the way things look show, by itself, that things are the 
way they look? Famously, some have proposed a priori arguments,5 and some have 
argued that there is no serious problem with appealing to empirical premises in the 
context of justifying belief in ~sk.6 But the difficulty of establishing these views is 
familiar from the literature of the past few decades.7
Theories of justification are meant to address the paradox by positing conditions 
for justification on which either (1) or (2) is false. For example, a theory of justifica-
tion might state that having justification to believe ~sk is not a necessary condition 
on having justification to believe p.8 If so, then (2) is false and we have avoided 
conclusion (3). Another example is the view that we have perceptual justification 
to believe ~sk (perhaps the justification arises from an inference from simple per-
ceptual premises).9 Then (1) is false and (3) is avoided. Defending such theories 
requires making plausible observations about justification and explaining away rival 
intuitions. This is the bulk of the work done in the theory of justification.
There are different ways of understanding the term ‘justification’ in epistemol-
ogy. The primary focus of most of this paper is the sort of justification at issue in the 
2 On the relation between closure and underdetermination, see Brueckner (1994), Cohen (1998), Vogel 
(2004), and Pritchard (2005).
3 See Bergmann (2000) on externalist, and Schiffer (2004) on contextualist solutions to the paradox.
4 I use italics for emphasis, to introduce a new term, and, in other cases, such as this, to denote the 
notion expressed by the italicized term.
5 See, for example, Putnam (1981) for an a priori argument for ~(sk). Peacocke (2004) seems to consider 
inference to the best explanation approaches to be a priori, while Alston (1993) refers to such arguments 
as “empirical.” See Vogel (2005) and Fumerton (2005) for further discussion.
6 For example, Alston (1986) and Pryor (2004).
7 Alston (1993) surveys many of these difficulties.
8 For example, Avnur (2012).
9 For example, Pryor (2004).
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paradox. The solutions that are discussed here are not meant to be “dissolutions,” 
or theories according to which there is no real problem or puzzle to begin with. If 
we take seriously the idea that the paradox presents an interesting problem for jus-
tification, we cannot take justification to be merely a positive status relating to the 
virtue, usefulness, or indispensability of a belief. For, unless something further is 
said about the virtue or utility in question, there is no reason to think that we lack 
such justification for believing ~sk. Instead, I take the justification at issue to be 
what philosophers call ‘epistemic’. This may suggest an essential connection with 
knowledge (episteme). But the justificatory status associated with knowledge, which 
is sometimes termed, following Plantinga (1993), ‘warrant’, is not the status I have 
in mind either. Rather, the paradox as it has appeared in the literature on justification 
involves a justificatory status in its own right, not necessarily in relation to knowl-
edge. Justification here is a positive status that entails that a belief fares well with 
respect to its own likely truth, and this is what is typically meant by ‘epistemic’ in 
the literature.10 Whether the “faring well” and the “likely truth” involved are subjec-
tive or objective, and what the conditions for them are, are controversies about this 
independent notion. As the idea that the notion is loaded is explained, below, the 
connection with the “likely truth” should become less obscure. When understood in 
this way, the case for (1) is clear, and solutions to the paradox begin to look difficult.
2  What it means for the notion of justification to be “loaded”
In this section I introduce the idea that justification is loaded and show how this 
resembles a Strawsonian claim that it is “analytic” that some beliefs or inferences 
count as justified.
As described above, theories of justification that address the paradox posit some 
conditions for justification on which either (1) or (2) is false. Usually, the theories do 
this by building a bias in favor of the reliability of our senses—or against the pos-
sibility that we are massively deceived—into those conditions. For example, con-
servatives such as White (2006) suggest that justification applies to our belief that 
we are not deceived, by default, or automatically (albeit defeasibly). And dogmatists 
such as Pryor (2000) hold that the appearance as of p is itself sufficient for immedi-
ate, prima facie justification to believe p. So, in using justification, one favors ~sk.11 
11 There is another, Wittgenstein-inspired approach to the paradox, recently termed ‘hinge epistemol-
ogy” (see Coliva and Moyal-Sharrock 2016; Avnur 2018 for some discussions), according to which prop-
ositions that are relevantly like ~sk (“hinge” propositions) get special treatment by our general epistemic 
principles. On this view, the way we use the notion of justification implies that it cannot apply to ~sk. It 
is not clear to me how exactly this relates to the claim, defended here, that justification favors ~sk. One 
might think that hinge epistemology does not posit a bias in favor of ~sk (thanks to Annalisa Coliva 
for helpful discussion here). Rather, on such views, it makes no sense at all to assess whether or not 
belief that ~sk is justified; ~sk is entirely left out of the picture. If so, then the theory developed here is 
an alternative to a hinge epistemological, Wittgenstein-inspired approach to justification. Two important 
developments of the “hinge” approach to the paradox are Coliva (2015) and Pritchard (2016). I myself 
10 See Cohen (2016) and Alston (2005) for critical discussion of various attempts to explain ‘epistemic’. 
Also see Wright (2014) for a defense of the view that some sorts of “pragmatic” justification have direct 
relevance to the epistemic justification at issue in skepticism.
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The central idea of this paper is that the bias displayed by these various theories of 
justification is a feature of the very notion of justification, since it is loaded. But 
what is loadedness, exactly?
To begin, consider a very rough description. We are used to the idea of a loaded 
question as one which has a controversial or charged assumption or implication. 
Like a loaded die or a biased source, a loaded question tips the balance in favor of 
some outcome (or answer), so it is not neutral with respect to the question. Likewise, 
a loaded notion, as I understand it, is a notion which, relative to some issue or topic, 
tips the balance in favor of some proposition. If the conditions of justification are 
such as to favor the conclusion that we are not deceived, then the notion of justifica-
tion is loaded, at least with respect to the issue of whether we are so deceived. To 
be clear, the notion is “unfair” or “biased” only with respect to the question whether 
sk is true, and only in the sense that it is not neutral with respect to the truth value 
of sk. If you were debating whether sk is true, appealing to a notion that is loaded 
with the assumption that it is true is not conducive to “unbiased” investigation. As I 
explain below, there is good reason for people to use such a notion, even if it is not 
well-suited to investigations into the truth of sk. Use of the notion itself is not neces-
sarily “unfair,” on this view, and indeed it is a very useful one for most purposes.
Why and how is justification biased in favor of ~sk in this way? The “why” is 
easy to answer. We live in a community in which everyone takes of granted, and 
assumes that everyone (else) takes for granted, that we are not massively deceived. 
It makes sense, then, that the notions we employ to evaluate our beliefs arise within, 
and incorporate, this assumption. This makes such notions loaded with respect to 
the philosophical question of whether we are deceived; the notion we use to evaluate 
beliefs is not neutral on our shared assumptions. Of course, the question remains, 
whether such a notion of justification tracks the objective truth, in the sense that jus-
tified beliefs are objectively likely to be true. This is the question whether we are, in 
fact, in a sk scenario. This is a legitimate question, but it poses a distinct challenge 
from the one posed by the paradox. I will take this issue up in Sects. 4 and 5, below.
But answering the “how” question can be more difficult, depending on how much 
detail we aim to provide. Just as there are different accounts of concepts in gen-
eral, there can be different corresponding accounts of how a concept or notion can 
be loaded with an assumption. This gets into murky and controversial philosophical 
territory. Here, I offer some brief, possible outlines of how justification is loaded. 
This will serve to indicate how the details might be worked out, rather than to argue 
for any particular set of details.
One possibility, perhaps the most obvious one given that the idea is originally 
due to Strawson, is that a concept’s being loaded with an assumption amounts to 
that assumption being a “semantic presupposition.” That is, ‘justified’ “semantically 
presupposes” that our perceptual states are likely to be accurate. However, I will not 
have defended this kind of view in Avnur (2012). One advantage of developing the loadedness approach 
I favor here is that most other theories of justification can be seen as versions of loadedness, but not of 




pursue this idea because the very notion of semantic presupposition is, notoriously, 
controversial. And it is not clear whether the standard features of semantic presup-
position are present here. For example, the negation of “S’s belief that p is justified,” 
which is “S’s belief that p is not justified,” does not obviously presuppose that our 
perceptual states are likely to be accurate. But, typically, negations of statements 
with presuppositions also have those presuppositions.
Presupposition aside, I will still take justification’s loadedness to be a matter 
of meaning. The idea is that whenever one uses ‘justified’, one must assume that, 
absent any information to the contrary, we are not massively deceived. That justifi-
cation has this requirement would seem to constitute a form of loadedness. But the 
question immediately arises, why one must make this assumption, and in what sense 
“must” one make it. I suggest that the best way to explain why one might always be 
required to make this assumption is that this follows (in a way I will explain below) 
from what ‘justified’ means; and the sense in which one “must” make this assump-
tion is, roughly, that otherwise one is not using our term ‘justified’ correctly. Both 
of these claims need to be further explained, of course. And, to be clear, I do not 
take this to be a proof that justification is loaded in the sense that some contingent 
assumption—that we are not deceived—is part of the notion of justification. Rather, 
what follows is a defense of a view that I take to be promising in various ways, and I 
think it best explains how our notion might be loaded.12
According to Strawson, it is analytic that inductive inferences are reasonable, or 
justified [“this is what ‘being reasonable’ means in such a context” (1952, p. 257)]. 
Applied to perceptual beliefs, the idea is that it is analytic that forming beliefs on the 
basis of sensory experience is justified. One proponent of this idea is Cohen (2010, 
p. 156), who suggests that we count, as a brute fact, perceptual beliefs as “rational” 
or justified, and therefore likely true.13 Since we simply count perceptual beliefs as 
justified and regard justified beliefs as more likely to be true, justification is loaded 
with the assumption that perception is reliable. For, by using justification, one sim-
ply counts perceptual beliefs as likely. Cohen has an “epistemic” sense of ‘likely’ 
in mind (e.g. 2010, p. 148), which depends on one’s available evidence, rather than 
objective likelihood. It may therefore be best to interpret this sort of loadedness as 
the view that justification is loaded with ~sk because we are, by default, justified in 
believing ~sk. One difficulty with this is the question of the relation between epis-
temic and objective likelihood, even granting that, from the subject’s own perspec-
tive, to judge that one’s own belief is epistemically likely at least commits one to the 
view that it is objectively likely. Setting this difficulty aside, Cohen’s Strawsonian 
view is a helpful first step towards understanding the loadedness of perceptual justi-
fication along Strawsonian lines.
A natural way to understand this is within a broadly inferentialist framework.14 
Consider an analogy. According to a famous example of Dummett’s (1973), the 
14 This idea is inspired by Brandom (2000, pp. 69–71), though we need not buy into his inferentialism 
about concepts in order to accept this way of understanding loadedness. Lange (2008) critically discusses 
a similar interpretation of Strawson’s ordinary language solution to induction.
12 Thanks to an anonymous referee for pressing this point.
13 Cohen cites Strawson in a footnote there, but doesn’t explicitly detail the connection.
1 3
Synthese 
pejorative boche is characterized by the following basic, canonical introduction and 
elimination rules: If S is German then S is boche; and if S is boche then S is cruel. 
This suggests that possession of the notion boche requires endorsing an inference 
from “S is German,” to “S is cruel.” The notion is thus loaded with the assumption 
that all Germans are cruel. If one wondered whether Germans were cruel, ‘boche’ 
would straightforwardly be a problematically loaded notion to employ.
Given the controversies surrounding inferentialism, it is worth noting that this 
account of loadedness doesn’t imply or assume that concepts (or notions) are indi-
viduated by their canonical inferences, one’s willingness to make them, or one’s 
thinking that, all things considered, they are warranted. Nor does one need to accept 
that anyone who possesses the concept is willing or all things considered inclined to 
perform these inferences. One could possess the concept but refuse to use it because 
one thinks the inferences it licenses are bad, or rejects the assumption built into the 
concept via its basic inferences.15
According to the features of justification I attributed to Cohen above, you can 
infer, merely by using justified, from “p is the content of a perceptual state” or 
“belief that p is a perceptual belief,” that “p is likely true.” Justification applies to 
perceptual beliefs and implies likely truth. Though Cohen had epistemic likelihood 
in mind, an externalist about justification could endorse a similar view about objec-
tive likelihood: perceptual beliefs are justified and therefore objectively likely to be 
true.16 From an inferential perspective, this is what it means to say that justifica-
tion is loaded with a bias towards ~sk. This perspective on loadedness fits well with 
dogmatist views of justification, according to which our perceptual justification is 
immediate. For, the introduction rule allows us to infer directly, from a belief’s being 
a perceptual belief, that the belief is justified. But many more details are required. 
For example, there could be other introduction rules—which leaves room for the 
possibility that some beliefs are also justified by default—since perception may not 
be the only source of justification.17 And there may well be other elimination rules 
such that, in the presence of defeaters, the belief in question is not justified, and 
not necessarily likely, after all. This would happen, for example, if your course of 
experience leads you to the conclusion that you are massively deceived. In that case, 
your starting assumption, that ~sk, was defeated by your subsequent evidence.
15 See McCullagh (2011) for an alternative version of inferentialism, which does not require endorse-
ment of any inference as a necessary condition on concept possession.
16 Of course, loading the notion of justification, even in this externalist way, does not make our percep-
tual beliefs true or objectively probably true. In a world in which sk is true, this externalist sort of loaded 
notion will have no extension, presumably. So, such a strategy does not answer the question whether sk 
is true, or whether our perceptual beliefs are generally or probably true. Rather, it shows that our notion 
of justification does not commit us to a paradox or contradiction, which is what the skeptical paradox 
challenges us to do. Below, in Sects. 4 and 5, I address the relation of this challenge to the challenge of 
establishing whether, in fact, our perceptual beliefs are objectively likely to be true.
17 For example, Silins (2005) holds that, while our perceptual justification is immediate, we also have 
default justification to believe ~sk.
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However, these details may not be worth working out. For, one might reasonably 
consider boche to be defective, precisely because it facilitates such non-conservative 
inferences. And, presumably, we don’t want to say that justification is defective, at 
least not so straightforwardly. Whatever would make boche defective, we presum-
ably prefer a theory of justification that does not entail that justification has the same 
problem.
Fortunately, there is a similar idea about technical terms that can be exploited 
here, and on this other idea, whether a concept is defective is not an a priori matter. 
Ramsey (1929) and Lewis (1972) famously held, roughly, that ‘mass’, in Newtonian 
theory, is semantically equivalent to ‘the property that obeys such-and-such laws’. 
Thus, employing the term ‘mass’ assumes that there is some such property. And the 
laws are, of course, substantive and contingent. Certain inferences are licensed by 
this assumption. For example, if x resists acceleration under force, then x has mass. 
And, if x has mass, then x gravitationally attracts other objects that have mass. So, 
the concept of mass is “loaded” with the assumption that objects that resist accelera-
tion under force attract each other. In judging that something has mass, you thereby 
make that assumption by (implicitly) appealing to mass theory.18
If justification resembles Newtonian mass in this way, then when employing 
the concept of justification, one assumes “justification theory,” according to which 
there is some property such that perceptual beliefs have it and anything that has it 
is objectively likely to be true. Justification is the property that, absent defeating 
information, obeys the “laws” of a world in which ~sk holds. Accordingly, justifi-
cation is loaded with a starting assumption, or a bias, that ~sk. Of course, even in 
a non-deceptive world, it is possible for other evidence to make one’s perceptual 
beliefs not so likely after all. So, again, the justification “laws” of this world, which 
determine when a belief is justified, need to be considerably more complicated than 
the brief description given here. They specify sufficient conditions only for prima 
facie justification.
These accounts of how justification is loaded nicely match the account of why 
we would use such a notion. ‘Justification’ is a helpful label that mediates between 
our initial assumptions about the reliability of our faculties and our beliefs, perhaps 
because of its explicitly positive evaluative connotation (i.e. one is approving of, and 
encouraging, the beliefs that one calls ‘justified’). It is easy to see why beings like us 
would come to use such a notion, just as it is easy to see why a population that uni-
versally assumes that all Germans are cruel would use boche. We all accept, absent 
any special information, that we are not massively deceived, and we expect that oth-
ers in our community accept that too. We are biased, and so are our notions.
There are different ways in which our bias manifests itself in our notion of jus-
tification, and these correspond to different theories of the conditions of justi-
fication. We have seen that on one kind of theory, justification is loaded with the 
assumption that perceptual beliefs are epistemically likely, or that belief that ~sk is 
(absent defeating evidence) justified. This is one, internalist way in which the notion 
can be biased. And another kind of theory has it that justification is loaded with 
18 Thanks to Dustin Locke for helpful discussion on this point.
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the assumption that ~sk, or that perceptual beliefs are objectively likely—they are 
merely likely only because there are ways for a perceptual belief to be false aside 
from some skeptical scenario holding, so they are never guaranteed to be true. Of 
course, even externalists can accept that a justified belief can sometimes be false. 
However the details work out, this would be a more externalist way in which the 
notion can be biased.
There are also other perspectives one can take on concepts, which imply different 
approaches to loadedness. For example, a non-inferentialist account can be gleaned 
from Goldman’s reliabilism, in both its “normal worlds” phase (1986) and the “folk-
ways” phase (1993). In the earlier phase, our assumptions determine what counts 
as a “normal world,” and this includes the assumption that no massive deception 
is going on. This in turn determines which beliefs are justified: those that would 
be reliable in a normal world (1986, pp. 107–108). In Goldman’s later phase, our 
assumptions about which of our processes are reliable directly determine which 
beliefs are deemed justified (1993, p. 160). Either way, the assumption’s determina-
tion of the concept’s extension provides an alternative account of how the concept is 
loaded with a bias, or the “chauvinism” of justification towards this being a normal, 
rather than a deceptive, world (108).19
Goldman (1986, p. 108) highlights what I call the ‘loadedness’ of justification by 
considering the analogy with cats (though he does not use the term ‘loaded’), which 
he attributes to Unger (1984), Putnam (1962) and Kripke (1980). If we discover that 
the things we’ve called ‘cats’ are (and have been) internally robotic, then, according 
to Goldman and others, we should conclude that there are no cats. For, whatever else 
cats are found to be, they could not be robotic; our belief that the things we call cats 
are organic and not robotic helps to determine what would count as a cat. In that 
sense, cat is loaded with the assumption that the things we usually call ‘cats’ are 
animals. As Goldman puts it, “What we believe about the things we call ‘cats’ deter-
mines the meaning.” (108).
But, granting that this is so, what is the appropriate analogy to draw with justifi-
cation? One idea is that what we believe about the beliefs we call ‘justified’—that 
many of them are perceptual beliefs and are (all else equal) likely true—determines 
what would count as ‘justified’. In that sense, justified is loaded with the assump-
tion that perceptual beliefs are likely to be true, or ~sk. Call this ‘the first version’ 
of the idea: a world in which we are massively deceived is a world in which there is 
no such thing as justification, just as a world of cat-robots is a world in which there 
is no such thing as a cat. However, according to Goldman, the “chauvinism” of jus-
tification has the opposite consequence. He suggests that, since it is built into justi-
fication that we are in a normal world, beliefs are justified if they would be reliably 
19 What follows is a brief discussion of Goldman’s view, as an example of a theory according to which 
justification is loaded. The idea that what we believe about things determines the meaning of term we use 
to refer to them needs more discussion than can be offered here for a full defense. A major issue is how 
to decide which beliefs about a thing determine the meaning of the relevant term. Admittedly, on the way 
of understanding loadedness under discussion, this will be a major commitment and so the details will be 




formed in a normal world, regardless of whether the actual world is normal. Call 
this the ‘second version’ of the idea: we assume that the actual world is normal, and 
hence beliefs that would be reliably formed in such worlds count as justified.
Though he doesn’t recognize this in his discussion, the situation with justifica-
tion, according to his, or the second, version of the idea, is quite different from 
the situation with cats. Goldman endorses the view that a world in which our 
assumption about cats is false is a world without cats. But a world in which our 
assumption about justified beliefs is false is still a world that contains justified 
beliefs, on Goldman’s preferred, second version of the idea. Since I agree with 
Goldman’s intuition about the cats, I find the first version more compelling than 
Goldman’s version. But they are both options for developing the idea of loaded-
ness. And, at any rate, by noticing the difference between the first and second ver-
sions, we can appreciate how different views about meaning can have important 
consequences for our understanding of epistemic justification.
These accounts of the loadedness of justification resemble Strawson’s idea 
about induction. Recall that, on Strawson’s view, it is analytic that beliefs about 
the unobserved based (in a certain way) on observed regularities, or inductive 
inference, are (prima facie) justified (Strawson 1952, pp. 256–257). According to 
the loadedness of perceptual justification, it is analytic that
(a) perceptual beliefs are prima facie justified, and
(b) such justified beliefs are likely to be true (absent defeaters).
(a) resembles Strawson’s main claim almost exactly. Recall that, in order to 
engage with skeptical worries directly, an account must posit some epistemic jus-
tification, which is, by definition, a positive status of faring well with respect to 
the relevant belief’s own truth. (b) should be regarded in that light, as guaran-
teeing that the justification at issue has the right connection with the truth. Is it 
philosophically problematic that (a) and (b) are analytic, and would the result-
ing view afford us a satisfying solution to the skeptical problem anyway? Before 
addressing these questions, I will offer some clarifications and raise some issues, 
and, in the next section, explain how the loadedness of justification can explain 
why the paradox, (1)–(3), arises.
Here are two clarifications. First, judging that a belief is justified is not the 
same as judging that it is justified if we are not deceived. The view here is that 
perceptual beliefs simply count as justified (absent defeaters) and therefore likely 
to be true. Why? Because that’s how the notion of justification works; it has built-
into it a bias in favor of ~sk.
Second, the type of justification under discussion must be restricted. I will be 
focusing exclusively on perceptual justification, because it is the skeptical prob-
lem involving sk that is at issue here. While I suggest that when you judge that 
your perceptual belief is justified, you thereby make a starting assumption that 
~sk, I grant that you do not assume this when you judge that you are justified in 
believing that you exist, or that 2 + 2 = 4. I claim only that perceptual justification 
is loaded with the starting assumption that ~sk.
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With these clarifications in mind, I can now raise some issues. Does it follow that 
our beliefs would be justified, and therefore likely, even if we were, in fact, mas-
sively deceived? What happens to the extension of justification if the assumption 
with which it is loaded is false, or if it assumes that something false is likely? Differ-
ent versions of loadedness may suggest different answers to this question (and hence 
they suggest different approaches to the “new evil demon” question, or the question 
of the status of the BIV’s perceptual beliefs), as we saw by considering the two ver-
sions of Goldman’s idea. I will set this issue aside, since I am not arguing for any 
particular way of explaining how justification is loaded. A more thorough develop-
ment of justification as a loaded notion would require extensive discussion of this 
point. Here, I have space only to argue that the general idea has explanatory power 
and is defensible.
Another issue arises when we consider non-perceptual justification. One might 
object that the notion of perceptual justification seems to be the same notion as, say, 
a priori justification, so that focusing exclusively on perceptual justification, and the 
bias towards ~sk, seems artificial. Isn’t there a more unified, general notion of jus-
tification of which perceptual justification is just one sort, and is such a notion con-
sistent with the account offered here?
A more general notion of justification is indeed consistent with the account of 
perceptual justification offered here. Here are two ways in which the account could 
be supplemented to generalize it.
First, the kinds of justification that don’t seem loaded with a bias towards ~sk—
e.g. the kind involved in the cogito and mathematical judgments—still imply the 
same thing as perceptual justification, namely likelihood and goodness (or positive 
evaluation) of the justified belief. They are for that reason naturally grouped together 
in our (pre-theoretical) thinking, and we may regard all notions which apply to 
beliefs and imply likelihood and goodness as sub-species of a general notion of jus-
tification. Justification in general, then, is a notion that applies to beliefs and implies 
likelihood and goodness (of the belief). There are different “kinds” of justification 
only in the sense that what makes justification loaded with respect to some particu-
lar question is its bias towards some particular assumption, and this is a function of 
the various application conditions.
But insofar as the implications of justification are potentially controversial, this 
is perhaps not an ideal response to the worry about generalizing the notion of jus-
tification. A more decisive, second response is as follows. We can, consistently 
with everything above about the loadedness of perceptual justification, broaden 
the assumption of justification in such a way that there is only one, fully general 
assumption with which the notion is loaded. This more general assumption would 
entail that ~sk (or that we are justified believing ~sk, depending on how loaded-
ness is detailed), so that all of the features of loadedness appealed to in this paper 
still apply. Though specifying exactly what this more general assumption is would 
take us too far afield, here is a brief sketch. The assumption might be that one can, 
given one’s current cognitive situation as one understands it, get at the truth by using 
one’s faculties. It would follow that, absent any other relevant information, one is 
not massively deceived, or ~sk. That is, it follows that, when it comes to empirical 
topics such as whether one has hands, one is not perceptually deceived. This would 
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have to be refined, surely. One faculty sometimes corrects another, for example. But, 
such complexities aside, it is plausible that I do assume that I can get at the likely 
truth through proper use of my faculties (including my logical and “insight” facul-
ties) while concluding that I am justified in believing that I exist, for example, or 
that 2 + 2 = 4. Thus, a general notion of justification could be seen to be loaded with 
a more general assumption, which entails ~sk. Here, though, we are focusing on ~sk, 
since we are concerned with skepticism about the external world.
3  Loadedness explains why the paradox arises
Recall that argument (1)–(3) constitutes a paradox because the conclusion of the 
skeptical argument, (3), is unacceptable, and (1) and (2) both seem plausible. Most 
epistemologists take (2) for granted, so for them explaining why the paradox arises 
requires explaining why (1) seems plausible and why (3) is unacceptable.
In order to explain why (1) is plausible, one must account for the difficulty of 
explaining how we could have justification to believe ~sk. If justification is loaded 
with a bias towards ~sk, then any judgment that some proposition is justified 
requires the starting assumption that ~sk. But, in the case of the judgment that there 
is justification to believe ~sk, the notion of justification is being applied to that start-
ing assumption. This loopy quality has the flavor of a paradox, since we seem to 
need to use a notion in order to secure that very notion’s bias, or starting assump-
tion. How can you get justified in believing something that the very notion of justifi-
cation assumes?
The appeal of (1), then, is that Justification’s bias toward ~sk is what’s doing the 
work to get you justified in believing ~sk, and that seems contrary to how one can 
get justified. Even if you appeal to an empirical premise, say, that you have hands, 
in order to infer ~sk, you regard that premise as justified, and thus worthy of use 
in an argument, only in virtue of the fact that the notion of justification is already 
biased towards ~sk—otherwise, why regard your experiences as evidence, or jus-
tification, for the proposition that you have hands?20 And that, it seems, is no way 
to become justified in concluding that ~sk, since the deck was stacked in favor of 
~sk all along.21 ~Sk is not just another proposition, and it doesn’t just happen to 
be difficult to explain our justification for believing it. Justification itself marks a 
special place for ~sk, and this explains the difficulty of establishing our justification 
20 See Wright (2007) for discussion of the distinction between having and claiming justification, or war-
rant, for a belief in the context of Moore’s “proof” of an external world.
21 This is often discussed in terms of “transmission-failure” or “epistemic circularity,” which divides 
dogmatists (or “liberals”) and conservatives. Wright (2002) and Pryor (2004) are the classic examples of 
conservative and liberal views on transmission failure, respectively. Wright’s (2004) version of the view 
concerns the broader notions of “acceptance” and “trust,” instead of belief, but he is widely interpreted 
to hold that the relevant beliefs have a default warrant. There is also a third option, sometimes called 
‘Moderatism’ (a term coined by Coliva 2012) which is defended in Avnur (2012) and Coliva (2012). 
This involves rejecting (2) in the paradox. The idea that justification is a loaded notion is neutral on all 
of these debates, and yet it still can explain why the inference from a simple perceptual premise to ~sk 
seems to fail (even if on reflection, we decide that it does not fail).
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for ~sk. Loadedness, then, makes sense of the apparent inescapability of (1). This 
is precisely the challenge that most epistemologists take on when considering the 
paradox.
To be sure, any of the steps taken above to explain why the paradox arises can 
be questioned and ultimately rejected. But they seem, on the face of it, compel-
ling, and that is why (1) seems compelling. Likewise, some philosophers hold that 
there are some good a priori arguments or considerations in favor of ~sk, and this 
would make a case against (1).22 But, if such a priori considerations aren’t obvi-
ous—and they don’t seem to most of us to be obvious—then the existence of such 
heroic a priori solutions to the paradox is compatible with the forgoing explanation 
of why (1) seems true in the first place. To be clear: it is compatible with the view 
defended here that (1) is false (or that (2) is false). What I’ve explained here is why 
(1) appears true. We may well have justification to believe ~sk, once the details of 
justification are sorted out.
Recall that, in order to explain why the paradox arises, it is also necessary to 
explain why (3) seems unacceptable. Loadedness can explain this. The negation of 
(3), absent any evidence that sk is true, is something like a conceptual truth. Percep-
tual beliefs just count as prima facie justified. So long as we know that we have some 
experience as of p, we know that our notion of justification (prima facie) applies to 
belief that p. Since we’re sure that we do have some such experiences, the idea that 
we lack justification to believe p, in the absence of any specific defeaters, is almost 
unthinkable. This is why, when one is confronted with (1)–(3), it only remains to see 
which of (1) or (2) is false, and why. This is exactly what the vast majority of the 
literature on the paradox does. The loadedness of justification explains this well. To 
be clear, then, on this account, if one rejects the idea that a perceptual belief is even 
prima facie justified, then one is either misusing our notion of justification, or refus-
ing to use it at all (as one might with boche). How else can you have an experience 
as of p, believe that p on that basis in the normal way, lack defeating evidence, and 
yet deny that the resulting perceptual belief is justified?
The view here is that justification is loaded with a bias towards ~sk, in virtue of 
the way the notion works, or given what it means to be justified. But, this does not 
mean that those who disagree about the specific conditions of justification lack an 
understanding of our very concept of justification. The only one lacking understand-
ing of what ‘justified’ means is one who accepts that we lack even prima facie per-
ceptual justification. That one of the premises of the paradox is false follows from 
what it means to be justified. But which one and why, and how this is consistent 
with our intuitions is not settled by the view defended here. On the contrary, as we 
will see below, the theory on offer here explains why the paradox arises, and why 
the work of anti-skeptical epistemologists is so difficult. It is only the claim that our 
perceptual beliefs are justified (somehow) that is not up for debate for those who 
understand justification, on this theory.
22 I have in mind both classic a priori approaches such as Descartes (1990) or Putnam (1981), as well as 




This explanation for why we regard (1)–(3) as a paradox extends to paradoxes 
involving scenarios or propositions that are entailed by the assumption that we are 
not massively deceived. This includes the proposition that our senses are gener-
ally reliable, that we are not dreaming, that we are not dreaming with socks on, that 
nature is uniform, and so on. For, if some proposition is entailed by the starting 
assumption of justification, it is just as difficult to see how we can gain justification 
to believe it by using that very notion (and lacking any further evidence).
4  Objections to loadedness: analyticity and arbitrariness
So far, I’ve introduced the idea that justification has a built-in, or “analytic” bias 
towards ~sk, and that this explains why the paradox involving our justification to 
believe ~sk arises.23 I’ve also noted that solving the paradox requires specifying 
some conditions for justification which are compatible with the falsity of (1) or (2), 
and explaining away the initial appeal of (1) or (2). Such solutions are clearly con-
sistent with the loadedness of justification. But now one might worry that, by build-
ing in a bias towards ~sk, we have thereby overstepped what a theory of justification 
can plausibly show, and trivialized the problem of skepticism. Similar worries were 
raised about Strawson’s view as a solution to the problem of induction. In this sec-
tion I consider the most important of these objections as applied to the loadedness of 
perceptual justification.
The first objection is that the claim that (a) and (b) are analytic is implausi-
ble, since it implies that something contingent is a matter of meaning. Recall that, 
according to the loadedness of perceptual justification, it is analytic that
(a) perceptual beliefs are prima facie justified, and
(b) such justified beliefs are likely to be true (absent defeaters).
One might think this is a problem because (a) and (b) together imply that per-
ceptual beliefs are likely to be true, or ~sk, and that sounds like a contingent claim. 
Note that this is a contingent claim only if “likely” in (b) is interpreted objectively, 
so that, taken together, (a) and (b) imply that perceptual beliefs are objectively likely 
to be true. (We have seen above that such an interpretation is optional.) So, let us 
construe it in this, objective way for the purpose of considering this objection. Even 
granting this interpretation, though, the loadedness of justification does not imply 
that one can come to know or derive the conclusion that perceptual beliefs are likely 
true, a priori or solely by consulting or observing one’s concepts. The sense in which 
one can “discover” that ~sk is implicated by justification needs only to be clarified 
23 One might think that, since justification is loaded with a bias towards ~sk, it is the wrong notion to 
use when evaluating the skeptical argument, which crucially involves ~sk. Why do epistemologists use 
such a notion, given their aims? Answer: the argument concerns justification. Appealing to our loaded 
notion of justification is not an option that epistemologists choose when confronting the paradox. Rather, 




to show this: you can discover that the way you employ justification implies ~sk, but 
that is not the same thing as discovering some evidence that ~sk.
On the version of the loadedness currently being considered, the notion of justifi-
cation is loaded with a starting assumption that sk is true, so that perceptual beliefs 
are (all else equal) objectively likely. In other words, it follows from how justifica-
tion works that perceptual beliefs are likely to be true. In just the same way, it fol-
lows from how boche works that all Germans are cruel, and it follows from how 
Newtonian mass works that things that resist acceleration under force attract other 
things that resist acceleration under force. This is problematic only if it follows that 
one can come to know such contingent truths a priori. But this is not so in any of 
these cases. To see why, consider, first, that it remains an a priori possibility that 
‘justification’, ‘boche’, ‘Newtonian mass’, are empty, or defective, or incoherent (as 
some have argued ‘boche’ is). Showing that the skeptical argument fails, or solving 
the skeptical paradox, removes one argument for the conclusion that ‘justification’ 
is empty. But there remains, on this account, another troubling possibility: that jus-
tification is loaded with a false starting assumption, or biased towards a false propo-
sition. To vindicate one’s use of such a loaded notion would require an independ-
ent reason to make such a starting assumption. Presumably, you cannot vindicate 
your use of a loaded notion by making its starting assumption, using the notion, and 
then inferring that its starting assumption must be correct. So, one cannot learn that 
~sk—that perceptual beliefs are objectively likely to be true—a priori or by appeal-
ing to the meaning of ‘justified’.
A clarification made in the previous section is worth repeating here. I am not 
arguing that we cannot be justified in believing ~sk. Rather, here I am arguing that 
we, on the face of it, we cannot gain justification to believe ~sk merely by using 
a concept that is loaded with the starting assumption that ~sk. This leaves open 
whether we are justified by default (without ever gaining justification for it) in 
believing ~sk, and also whether there is some other evidence or argument for ~sk 
that would justify that belief. (a) and (b) are not problematically analytic. Rather, 
they make explicit the starting assumption, or bias loaded into justification. Being 
implied by a notion is one thing, being knowable by inference from a mere use of 
the notion is another.
Although the forgoing should assuage the worry that the analyticity of (a) and (b) 
is problematic, one might still wonder how ~sk can be part of, or follow from, some 
notion. One way to arrive at a theory of justification by a priori reflection is to think 
about what we mean (or perhaps what we ought to mean) by ‘justified’. If justifica-
tion is a loaded notion, it is not mysterious how reflecting on the notion results in 
the conclusion that (absent contrary evidence) sk is true. It is obviously possible 
to discover your assumption from the armchair, and to see that this assumption is 
“built in” to a notion you are using.24 Still, it is not a priori, or a matter of meaning, 
whether the assumption is true. Realizing that justification is loaded is just realizing 
that we’ve been assuming something all along, and that this assumption has influ-
enced the way we’ve constructed our notions.
24 This is exactly what happens when Goldman and Cohen theorize, as we’ve seen above.
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At this point, having seen a way out of the original worry, one might worry that 
the loadedness of justification doesn’t solve any skeptical problem, since it doesn’t 
allow us to infer whether sk is true, or objectively likely to be true. Rather, all it does 
is show us how we use some term. As Salmon (1957) famously put it, in objecting 
to Strawson’s analytic solution to the problem of induction: “If you use inductive 
procedures you can call yourself ‘reasonable’—and isn’t that nice.” Another, more 
common way of putting the objection is in terms of relativism: if ~sk is built into 
our notion of justification, and if we still have no way of determining whether ~sk is 
true, then why use this, rather than some other notion of justification that is loaded 
with some other starting assumption instead? This objection has been made by Bon-
jour (1998), Salmon (1957), Skyrms (1975), Lange (2008), and others. In Bonjour’s 
version (1998, p. 199), we would have nothing to say in response to a group of peo-
ple who loaded their notion of justification with the reliability of some religious text. 
Whatever Strawson can say in defense of his notion, the religious community can 
say it in defense of its own notion: “This is what we count as justified!” It seems to 
apply to the view presented here, too: whatever we can say in defense of our loaded 
notion of justification, the religious community has that defense too.
However, this objection conflates different skeptical problems. I think the reason 
that this objection has been so widely accepted is that it is sound with respect to its 
target, but its proper target is narrower than philosophers have realized. What the 
objection shows is that if one wants to vindicate one’s use of a loaded notion, one 
cannot do so merely by making claims invoking that notion. However, vindicating 
our use of justification is a distinct project from the project of solving the paradox. 
The conditions for justification, which are often appealed to in different solutions 
to the paradox, betray a bias towards ~sk built into our notion. Those conditions 
imply that some premise of the paradox is false. But those a priori knowable condi-
tions themselves, as conditions of a loaded notion, won’t help to vindicate our use 
of this, rather than some other, notion, as the objection illustrates. That a theory of 
the conditions of justification cannot itself vindicate our use of justification does not 
show that any such theory is false. Rather, it just shows the limits of what a theory 
of the conditions of justification can do. It cannot show that some contingent claim 
such as ~sk is true, and it cannot vindicate our use of this, rather than some alterna-
tive, notion. But it may well still be true, and it may well still afford us a solution 
to the paradox by implying that some premise of the paradox is false. That is, such 
a theory of justification can remove one important reason one might have had for 
thinking that justification is empty or defective: the paradox.
The forgoing response to the objection sets up the task for the next section, which 
is to distinguish different kinds of skeptical challenge in light of the loadedness of 
justification, and to explain what vindicating our use of the notion would require. 
But note that the response is not entirely novel, and nor is it a special burden of the 
view defended here. Pryor (2000) famously distinguished two different anti-skepti-
cal projects: the modest one is to say which premise of the paradox is false appealing 
only to claims that we, the non-skeptics, accept. The ambitious one is to do the same 
using only claims that the skeptic will accept. He, and many others, aspire only to 
the modest project, and therefore should not be worried by the relativism objection. 
We accept ~sk, and this explains why we use justification, and the conditions of 
1 3
Synthese 
justification account for which premise in the paradox is false. The objector’s reli-
gious community can also say, “we aspire only to the modest anti-skeptical project 
with respect to your religious skepticism,” in response to a challenge to their prac-
tice. Most epistemologists, whether they know it or not, accept that theories of jus-
tification cannot do more than solve the paradox: the vast majority of anti-skeptical 
papers claim to solve the paradox without citing any evidence that ~sk is actually 
true.25 Rather, such papers are concerned with conceptual, a priori matters, which is 
what is required to solve the paradox. Next, I will propose a more radical distinction 
between anti-skeptical projects, beyond Pryor’s dialectical insight.
5  What is “the” problem of skepticism?
It is a metaphysical question whether we are massively deceived—it is different in 
kind from the question of whether or how we are justified in believing that we are 
not massively deceived. If it seems inappropriate, or unsatisfying, to use our notion 
of justification in the absence of meeting this metaphysical challenge, then, in that 
sense, Bonjour and others’ relativist challenge is “deeper” than the one posed by 
the paradox. The paradox itself can, at least in principle, be addressed by sorting 
out the way the notion of justification works. We need only come up with a sat-
isfactory account of the notion on which one of the skeptical premises are false. 
But this involves employing the notion of justification, whose legitimacy, according 
to the deeper skeptical challenge, is in question. The latter, metaphysical skeptical 
challenge is to figure out how we are causally connected to the world, not how our 
notion of justification works or whether its use gives rise to contradictions as the 
paradox threatens to show. It is an empirical question.
All any (non-skeptical) theorist of justification can say is, “we can call our per-
ceptual beliefs ‘justified’, and isn’t that nice?” But the fact that things are “nice” in 
that way can be significant, if the aim is to refute the idea that things are not “nice” 
in that way, which is what the paradox threatens by appealing to our notion of jus-
tification in defense of premises that lead to the conclusion that no belief is justi-
fied. So, if the paradox is what we are interested in, then the idea that justification 
is a loaded notion has much to offer. It explains why the paradox arises and gives a 
framework for providing the details of the precise conditions of justification such 
that some premise of the paradox is false. If, instead, it is the metaphysical skeptical 
question, whether ~sk, that interests us, then loadedness does nothing to help. But 
neither does any a priori theory of justification.
25 Above, I noted the most obvious exceptions to this, namely those who present an a priori argument 
for ~sk. They do not attempt to solve the paradox by appealing to a theory of justification. Many, though, 
are not in this camp. This includes some externalists, such as Goldman (1986, 1993) since even on that 
account, what counts as a “normal world,” or what assumptions we make about which faculties are reli-
able, while knowable from the armchair, does not constitute an argument that ~sk is true. This point 
is made by Stich (1990, p. 95). Beyond discussion of Goldman, Stitch call theories of justification as I 
am understanding them “analytic epistemology,” and his discussion is similar to this one in some ways, 
though the aim is different (Stitch 1990, pp. 91–93).
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It is tempting to inquire how important the metaphysical question is. On one 
level, it is just another question about the world. But it is among the philosophi-
cally rich questions, like “Is there a God?” or “Why is there anything at all?” These 
pose specific questions about what is out there, but they are especially interesting 
because, presumably, it matters to us whether there is a God, or why there is any-
thing at all. Arguably, it matters to us whether we are massively deceived, because 
much of what we care about is discovered through our senses. But, from an episte-
mological perspective, why does it matter whether ~sk is true?
One way the question whether ~sk can be seen as important to epistemology 
is that it can be understood as an attempt to answer the question: Why care about 
whether our beliefs are justified? For, our notion of justification is loaded with a 
bias, or starting assumption, that ~sk; clearly we should care about justification only 
if it is loaded in the right direction. This is similar to the question “Why be moral?” 
or “Why should I care if my actions are right?” Notice that this is different from 
asking “Is anything immoral?” or “Is anything wrong?” If the principles of moral-
ity deem murder to be wrong, then that answers the latter questions. But the former 
questions are deeper in the sense that they inquire about the significance of those 
principles. Likewise, the question “Is any belief justified?” is, given loadedness, 
rather easy: “Yes, perceptual ones, for example, are typically justified; that’s how 
‘justified’ works.” But the question “Why care about which beliefs are justified?” 
or “Why care about justification?” is harder, and requires considering the biases or 
starting assumptions of justification.
Trying to determine whether we are massively deceived is not the only way to 
address this sort of question. The question is “Why use, or care about,” some notion. 
A rationale for accepting a notion is not the same thing as a justification for believ-
ing a proposition. That is, it isn’t obvious that the answer to the “why” question must 
come in the form of evidence or proof, or some epistemic justification for believing, 
that we are not massively deceived. It may come in the form of some other, non-
epistemic considerations in favor of accepting that proposition, or using a notion 
that assumes it.26 If there is some non-epistemic but strong reason to use justifica-
tion, loaded as it is with ~sk, then that seems to answer the questions “Why use the 
concept” and “Why care about the concept?” Perhaps these non-epistemic reasons 
are practical, or perhaps they stem from certain aspects of human nature. In any 
case, the “why care” question is not equivalent to the metaphysical question, since it 
doesn’t necessarily demand proof, or evidence, or epistemic justification, to believe 
~sk. And the paradox is certainly different from either one of those questions, since 
it can be answered by appeal to our notion of justification and how it works.
To sum up, if justification is loaded, then the question of whether our perceptual 
beliefs are prima facie justified is relatively easy: of course they are, since the notion 
of justification guarantees it. Questions about the credentials of our notion of justi-
fication seem much harder, but they are not necessarily epistemological questions. 
They concern why we should use or care about our notion rather than another, or 
else they concern metaphysical (perhaps empirical) facts about our world and how 
26 Alston (1993) reaches a similar conclusion.
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we are connected to it. I leave it an open question whether such questions deserve 
to be regarded as “the real” skeptical problems; they are certainly distinct from the 
challenge of solving the paradox.
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